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UNITED STATES TRANSPORTATION COMMAND**

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JOINT TASK FORCE PORT OPENING VERIFICATION PROGRAM

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This instruction establishes the verification program for those units that directly support United States Transportation Command's (USTRANSCOM) Joint Task Force Port Opening (JTF-PO) mission. It provides guidance and procedures for the JTF-PO Verification Program and establishes general parameters. This instruction applies to all JTF-PO units within Air Mobility Command (AMC), Military Sealift Command (MSC), Surface Deployment and Distribution Command (SDDC), Air National Guard, Army National Guard, and U.S. Navy Reserve. Refer recommended changes and questions about this instruction to the office of primary responsibility using Air Force Form 847, *Recommendation for Change of Publication*. Ensure that all records created as a result of processes prescribed in this publication are maintained in accordance with USTRANSCOM Instruction 33-32, *USTRANSCOM Records Management Program*.

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Chapter 1 Verification Program Overview

1.1. Overview.

The purpose of the JTF-PO Verification Program is to provide the Commander of U.S. Transportation Command (CDRUSTRANSCOM) joint assessment of an Active Duty or Reserve Component unit's ability to perform JTF-PO Aerial Port of Debarkation (APOD) and Sea Port of Debarkation (SPOD) operations. The program focuses on unit readiness and compliance with Public Law, Department of Defense and USTRANSCOM directives and command policies. The critical enabling nature of the port opening capability, along with the short response times for deployment, require units to maintain strict standards of readiness and be verified as meeting these standards prior to real world responses. As a Combatant Command level verification, this program is designed to evaluate synchronized operations, interoperability and joint capability between USTRANSCOM Component Commands, rather than service specific responsibilities and readiness. All verifications will use the current Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETL) (ref: Joint Task Force - Port Opening Concept of Operations version 2.0 Annex G) as the baseline for performance metrics, and will focus on the five Joint Integration Areas: Joint Assessment Team, Joint Operations Center, Command, Control, Communications and Computers/In-transit Visibility, Cargo and Passenger Operations, and Force Protection as defined in the standing execution order for JTF-PO requirements. Additionally, verification evaluators will:

1.1.1. Assess sustained and long-term capabilities of JTF-PO.

1.1.2. Evaluate the component unit's mission performance, effectiveness, and efficiency in the following functional areas:

1.1.2.1. AMC-provided command and control, aerial port, communications, and force protection.

1.1.2.2. For APOD, SDDC-provided operations, communications, transportation, forward distribution node, and in-transit visibility.

1.1.2.3. For SPOD, SDDC-provided command and control, communications, forward distribution node, in-transit visibility, and force protection.

1.1.2.4. MSC-provided operations, port liaison, and ship husbandry.

1.1.3. Assess effectiveness and interoperability of secure information systems.

1.1.4. Assess effective joint operational security, antiterrorism, and force/resource protection capability.

1.1.5. Assess integration with established links to joint tasks and joint capability.

1.1.6. Assess systemic areas and issues (i.e., mission critical responsibilities shared by lateral or host agencies or higher headquarters).

1.2. Office of Primary Responsibility (OPR).

The JTF-PO Verification Program is a Commander's program designed to provide oversight of units who perform JTF-PO APOD or SPOD operations to ensure their joint operating capability.

1.2.1. CDRUSTRANSCOM designates the Director of Operations and Plans (TCJ3) as the OPR for JTF-PO Verification Program, and as the verifying official for JTF-PO units.

1.2.2. TCJ3 will:

1.2.2.1. Report capability of units to perform the JTF-PO mission to CDRUSTRANSCOM.

NOTE: Units are still responsible for reporting their readiness in Defense Readiness Reporting System (DRRS).

1.2.2.2. Provide overall verification assessment.

1.2.2.3. Designate Chief, Joint Training and exercises Division (TCJ3-T) as administration and execution point of contact for all JTF-PO verifications.

1.2.2.4. Establish program guidelines.

1.2.2.5. Coordinate and publish the biennial Verification Program schedule.

1.2.2.6. Publish letters of instruction (LOI), verification notification/execution messages, and release exercise related orders and manage exercise tracking through the USTRANSCOM Deployment and Distribution Operations Center (DDOC).

1.2.2.7. Appoint verification team leads and coordinate team requirements based on participating units.

1.2.2.8. Schedule verification inbriefs, informal outbriefs (hotwashes), and formal outbriefs.

1.2.2.9. Provide/facilitate/assign JTF-PO specific training/retraining as required.

1.2.2.10. Maintain a database of potential JTF-PO Commanders (CDR).

1.2.2.11. Act as OPR for exercise planning, development, and white cell operations to include scenario and inject development.

1.2.2.12. Publish after action reports (AAR).

1.2.2.13. Collect and publish lessons learned in the Joint Lessons Learned Information System. This will include identifying and promoting best practices and benchmark programs to ensure continued performance growth of JTF-PO units.

1.2.3. USTRANSCOM Director, Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems (TCJ6) will:

1.2.3.1. Provide functional area expertise as required to serve on the USTRANSCOM Verification Team.

1.2.3.2. Ensure JTF-PO communication support plan is feasible.

1.2.3.3. Review and determine JTF-PO communication capabilities identifying unit level discrepancies and systemic issues.

1.3. Participation and Exemptions.

All JTF-PO units will be required to complete verification biennially (once every 24 months). Additionally, they will be required to complete a minimum of one USTRANSCOM sponsored JTF-PO joint training event in years in which verification does not occur. NOTE: Deployment and Distribution Support Teams (DDST) / Seaport Command Element (SCE) will be verified by SDDC independent of JTF-PO verifications.

1.3.1. RPOEs must complete one SPOD and one APOD verification every 24 months, and one APOD and one SPOD training event in the years in which verification does not occur.

1.3.2. Exemptions from verifications for a real world execution can occur and credit given when the scope of the deployment is robust enough to meet the JMETs and the requirements of this instruction. The deployment should occur within 12 months of the unit's scheduled verification. A verification/AAR report will be provided to the TCJ3 by the JTF-PO CDR. The TCJ3 will make the final determination of unit verification based on this report and recommendations from the verification team.

1.3.3. Exemptions from training events can be requested through TCJ3 for those years in which a JTF-PO team has completed a real world requirement, provided the unit successfully completed JMET requirements.

1.4. Event Types and Frequency.

The scope of verifications and training events will vary based on individual unit requirements. TCJ3 will coordinate with component-level representatives to ensure frequency requirements are met.

1.4.1. Verifications are designed to be limited in scope to facilitate observation of joint integration areas and permit a small verification team footprint (6-12 team members).

1.4.2. Training events are designed to allow units the opportunity to improve upon their processes and procedures prior to verification. Unit CDRs are highly encouraged to work with their respective component representatives prior to these events to ensure potentially weak areas, or those needing additional training, are incorporated into the scenario during the planning cycle.

1.4.3. TCJ3 is the approval authority to exceed event frequency requirements in paragraph 1.3.

1.5. Verification Requirements.

In order for an event to meet verification requirements, the following conditions must be met:

1.5.1. Units must be considered fully mission capable according to their Service component requirements, to include passing Service-level inspections/evaluations.

1.5.1.1. Any unit failing a Service-level inspection/evaluation will not be scheduled for JTF-PO verification prior to completing that event with a satisfactory/passing grade.

1.5.1.2. Units who fail Service inspections/evaluations after verification will be considered unverified, until they pass the event, and meet the requirements for reverification as determined by TCJ3. This may include additional ground training, additional training exercises, spot checks, or a full verification event.

1.5.1.3. If a unit fails a Service inspection/evaluation based on discrepancies not associated with JMET areas, TCJ3 may waive verification evaluation requirements, and reverify the unit upon successful completion of the Service inspection/evaluation.

1.5.1.4. Verification events and Service inspections/evaluations will not be scheduled concurrently unless specifically requested by unit/JTF-PO CDRs, coordinated through the participating Component Commands, and approved by TCJ3.

1.5.2. Unit training must be current in accordance with the JTF-PO Joint Training Plan and operations order.

1.5.2.1. Change of unit leadership (those acting as JTF-PO CDR or operations officers) does not constitute non-verification; however, these individuals must receive required JTF-PO training within 60 days of being assigned to the unit. This training consists of the JTF-PO 101 brief and JTF-PO CDR brief.

1.5.2.2. Units will coordinate JTF-PO CDR training through their appropriate component-level representative.

1.5.3. Units must, as a minimum, perform Phase I (Preparation), II (Joint Assessment Team), and III (Deploy, Open, Operate) operations and meet associated JMETs in accordance with the Joint Training Plan. Requirements will be further defined in the exercise Fragmentary Order (FRAGO) or LOI.

1.5.4. A qualified (TCJ3-approved) Verification Program team must be present.

1.6. Credit for Real World Operations.

During real world operations for verification, TCJ3 may give verification credit based on the scope of operations and the AAR provided by the JTF-PO CDR.

1.7. Safety and Security.

Safety and security must be emphasized during both training events and verifications. JTF-PO CDRs should conduct a risk assessment prior to operations, and emphasize physical security as well as information security through appropriate operational security and information condition procedures.

Chapter 2 Verification Program Team

2.1. Verification Team.

The composition of the verification team depends upon the units receiving verification. TCJ3 will organize and fill required evaluator positions for the team and will serve as the primary point of contact for verification administration and execution.

2.2. Team Composition.

The joint verification team will consist of subject matter experts from USTRANSCOM as well as its AMC, SDDC, and MSC components.

2.2.1. Core team members will consist of a team lead selected by TCJ3 from the USTRANSCOM staff, a team administrator, representatives from TCJ3-T, TCJ6 and component operational and functional area leads (as applicable). NOTE: A core team member may represent more than one function (i.e., team lead may also serve as the TCJ3-T representative).

2.2.2. Team leads will set the number of required evaluators, and assist in identifying personnel requirements for team augmentation. At a minimum, augmentees must represent the functional areas listed in paragraph 1.1.2.

2.2.3. Verification team members will not be used to inspect their own units. Specifically, Contingency Response Group/Rapid Port Opening Element/Expeditionary Port Unit (CRG/RPOE/EPU) personnel cannot evaluate other CRG/RPOE/EPU personnel within their organization without prior permission from TCJ3.

2.2.4. Augmenting team members must be highly qualified in their specialty, with Wing/Brigade level personnel or above preferred.

2.2.5. Once evaluator requirements are identified, TCJ3 will task their appropriate component to select functional volunteers to augment the verification teams. Augmentee selections will be made within 60 days prior to the verification.

2.2.6. When selected for augmentation, an email message will be sent to the individual, as applicable, and will contain the period of verification, travel and reporting procedures, and orders preparation instructions.

2.2.7. Not later than 10 days prior to start of exercise (STARTEX) the verification team lead will conduct a meeting via Defense Connect Online, telecon, or video teleconference with team members and the designated JTF-PO CDR to coordinate evaluation scope, expectations and requirements.

2.2.8. Team leads are encouraged to conduct daily meetings during exercise with all evaluators/OCs to track JMET completion and/or progress.

2.3. Team Training Requirements.

All team members will receive training on the JTF-PO Verification Program prior to STARTEX. This training will be provided by TCJ3 at the verification location and will consist of a discussion of the mission orders, command and control, units involved, grading criteria, report timelines, expectations, and administrative details.

2.4. Team Support requirements.

Support requirements may vary and may include workspace, debriefing location, computer/printer support, government vehicles, billeting, etc. Units receiving verification will assist TCJ3 in obtaining these requirements in accordance with the LOI or FRAGO.

2.5. Team Funding.

Funding for verification augmentees will be provided by USTRANSCOM as funds allow.

2.6. Augmentee Travel Arrangements.

Augmentees will make their own travel arrangements and provide their travel itinerary to the designated team lead no later than 15 days from STARTEX. Temporary duty orders for augmentees will be prepared by the individual's unit or directorate. All information required to prepare travel orders will be included in the augmentation fund cite message or letter.

2.7. Trusted Agents.

Verification events will require support from individuals outside of the verification team and participants. These individuals will be designated as trusted agents. In order to perform support related tasks, they will be given access to scenario information in advance. Trusted agents will not share any information provided to them by the verification team with exercise participants.

2.8. USTRANSCOM Approved Observers.

Component Commands wishing to send observers to a verification event must get approval from TCJ3. Observers will be given access to the scenario information, and will be allowed access to the exercise area. Observers will adhere to all restrictions based on current security clearance.

2.8.1. Component Commands are limited to two observers per verification event.

2.8.2. USTRANSCOM will not fund observers for verification events.

2.8.3. Observers are in a trusted agent status and must remain unobtrusive.

2.8.4. Non-approved observers will not be allowed during verification exercises.

Chapter 3 Conduct of the Verification Program

3.1. Event Scheduling Procedures.

TCJ3 will publish an annual verification/training event schedule referenced in the Fiscal Year Commander's Training Guidance. Units will coordinate their preferred dates for events through their appropriate chain of command. The components must resolve any disputes and send final requests no later than 1 Sep. Semi-annual updates (October/April) will attempt to forecast events and scheduled units in two-year increments.

3.2. STARTEX.

STARTEX will be designated by exercise message traffic as the beginning of verification operations. All timelines are based off the identified STARTEX.

3.3. Letters of Instruction (LOI).

LOIs are designed to provide JTF-PO units advanced notification of expectations based on individual verification or training criteria and events. LOIs will be released with normal message traffic to units both receiving and supporting the verification. Information may include event lengths, deliverables required, point of contacts for evaluation areas, or additional support requirements. NOTE: LOIs will only be used when a FRAGO release timeline is compressed, or to provide FRAGO errata.

3.4. Requests for Information (RFI).

TCJ3 will act as white cell lead for all verifications to include distribution of exercise message traffic and scenario information.

3.4.1. RFIs are generated when a unit requires information from a higher headquarters, other agencies, or other units who are outside the scope of the exercise verification. All RFIs will be routed in accordance with the FRAGO or LOI.

3.4.2. RFI responses will be based on real world capabilities and white cell availability. Responses may take up to 6 hours based on information requested.

3.4.3. Basic clarifications can be addressed by any verification team member.

3.5. Other sources of Information.

Information regarding JTF-PO verification and training standards are found in the following documents:

3.5.1. USTRANSCOM Standing Execution Order for JTF-PO requirements.

3.5.2. JTF-PO (Aerial Port of Debarkation) Concept of Operations Version 2.0.

3.5.3. JTF-PO (Seaport of Debarkation) Concept of Operations Version 2.0.

Chapter 4 Program Reports and Assessment

4.1. Reports and Discrepancies.

All verifications and training events will generate an after action report (AAR). The OPR for verification AARs is TCJ3. The OPR for training event AARs is the JTF-PO CDR.

4.1.1. Reports will provide a brief description of the overall mission, units involved, timelines, and cargo/passengers processed. Reports will also highlight discrepancies associated with execution.

4.1.2. Following verifications, JTF-PO CDRs may provide a rebuttal to any discrepancies identified in the informal outbrief (hotwash), or provide additional information or clarifications as they see fit. This rebuttal should be in memorandum format, and must be received no later than 15 days after the verification. TCJ3 is the adjudication authority for accepting the rebuttal request, denying the rebuttal request, or including the rebuttal in the final report for verification consideration.

4.1.3. Following training events, JTF-PO CDRs will provide TCJ3 with an AAR for incorporation into the final report no later than 15 days after the event.

4.2. Assessment and Criteria.

The final assessment for the JTF-PO Verification Program is Pass/Fail. Each primary component unit will receive an assessment based on the total performance of the JTF-PO, the performance of the unit, severity of discrepancies, and cumulative discrepancies noted.

4.2.1. Team leads will provide a Pass/Fail or Pass with comment recommendation to TCJ3. Pass with comment will recommend specific training actions for a unit that is deficient in specific, minor areas, but is still capable of effectively carrying out real world operations.

4.2.2. TCJ3 is the final verification official and will direct additional action as required.

4.3. Discrepancies.

Evaluators will annotate deviations from JMETS standards as discrepancies. Discrepancy write-ups will:

4.3.1. Describe, in sufficient detail, the deficiency and contextual facts as necessary to clearly convey the defect requiring resolution. The written description alone should be adequate for the inspected party to begin corrective action planning.

4.3.2. Provide analysis of the severity of the discrepancy using critical, significant, or minor verbiage.

4.3.3. Reference the applicable JMETS or other source documentation.

4.3.4. Address impact of continued deviations, deficiencies or non-compliance on the mission.

4.3.5. Identify the office of primary responsibility and the office of collateral responsibility, if applicable.

4.4. Systemic Discrepancies.

Not all discrepancies are the direct result of the unit. In cases where discrepancies result from issues beyond the unit's control, such as responsibilities shared by higher headquarters, civilian support agencies, or responsibilities shared jointly by multiple agencies, the discrepancy will be noted as systemic.

4.4.1. JTF-PO units with systemic discrepancies noted will not be penalized for that issue for verification, although they are expected to assist in identifying these areas and mitigating them to the best of their abilities.

4.4.2. TCJ3 will identify all systemic discrepancies in the final AAR.

4.4.3. TCJ3 will identify appropriate office of primary responsibilities and office of collateral responsibilities to correct systemic discrepancies. This may include the JTF-PO units.

4.4.4. TCJ3 will brief systemic discrepancies and updates to the CDRUSTRANSCOM during the quarterly JTF-PO in progress review.

4.5. Hotwash.

All JTF-PO units receiving a biennial verification will receive a hotwash at the completion of the event. The hotwash will include major areas of concern, will highlight any best practices or benchmark programs, and will provide a timeline for the AAR and rebuttal process. The hotwash will not include the final grade.

4.5.1. The hotwash will be conducted by the JTF-PO Verification team lead or his designee.

4.5.2. The hotwash is designed for the JTF-PO CDR and the component leads. The JTF-PO CDR may request additional individuals attend the hotwash.

4.5.3. While JTF-PO CDR may request clarification on any items during the hotwash, it will not be considered a formal rebuttal. The CDR must complete the rebuttal process in order to ensure comments are considered for the final report.

4.6. Formal Outbrief.

A formal outbrief will be held once TCJ3 approves the AAR, assigns the final grade to the JTF-PO, and determines if additional requirements exist. The formal outbrief will typically occur via video teleconference, Defense Connect Online, or telecon, and is chaired by the TCJ3 or his designated representative.

4.6.1. Formal outbriefs will be scheduled no later than 30 days after the completion of the verification event.

4.6.2. Required participants include the JTF-PO CDR, CRG CDR (as applicable), EPU CDR (as applicable), RPOE CDR, AMC-A3M (as applicable), SDDC-G37, MSC-N3 (as applicable), and verification team lead.

4.7. Verification Failure/Pass with Comments.

Units who fail to achieve a passing grade as determined by TCJ3 will be unable to stand alert or deploy as part of JTF-PO operations until retraining is complete and the unit completes a follow-up verification.

4.7.1. Retraining and follow up or verification will occur within 90 days of the initial failure (APOD) or 120 days (SPOD).

4.7.2. TCJ3 will determine the scope of the follow-up verification based on the discrepancies noted and the recommendation of verification team.

4.7.3. Units that receive a pass with comments grade may need to receive additional training or provide training completion information in accordance with the AAR but no later than 90 days (APOD) or 120 days (SPOD) following the verification.

4.8. Split Verification.

Based on the limited number of JTF-PO component units it may be necessary to run a split verification. Under these circumstances, a primary and support component will be designated. The primary component is the unit who is undergoing verification due to an unverified status or is in the window for re-verification. The support component is a unit that is fully verified and not within the re-verification window.

4.8.1. Only the primary component will receive a grade for verification and is responsible for providing any required support to the verification team.

4.8.2. The support component will conduct the verification exercise as a training event, and will comply with all current JMETs in order to support the JTF-PO CDR fully.

4.8.2.1. A supporting unit that fails to comply with JMET standards, and/or is deemed as significantly contributory to a primary unit's failure will receive a recommended for verification removal.

4.8.2.2. A supporting unit that meets JMET standards and/or is not deemed a significant contributor to the failure of a primary unit will remain verified.

4.8.2.3. Support units may still receive discrepancies in the Verification AAR in order to keep an accurate record of occurrences.

4.9. Reply Requirements and Instructions.

TCJ3 will track all discrepancy replies and systemic discrepancy progress. Replies or requests for clarification will be sent to the organizational inbox USTCJ3-TC@USTRANSCOM.MIL, on SIPR USTCJ3-TC@USTRANSCOM.SMIL.MIL, or as specified by the AAR.

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Director of Operations and Plans

Attachment 1

GLOSSARY OF REFERENCES, ABBREVIATIONS, ACRONYMS, AND TERMS

Section A – References

Section B - Abbreviations and Acronyms

AAR – After Action Report
AMC – Air Mobility Command
APOD - Aerial Port of Debarkation
BLOS – Beyond Line of Sight
CBRNE – Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and High-Yield Explosive
CDR - Commander
CRG – Contingency Response Group
EPU – Expeditionary Port Unit
FRAGO – Fragmentary Order
HNS – Host Nation Support
JMET - Joint Mission Essential Task
JOA – Joint Operations Area
JTF-PO - Joint Task Force – Port Opening
LOI – Letter of Instruction
LOS – Line of Sight
MSC - Military Sealift Command
RFI – Request for Information
RFID – Radio Frequency Identification
RPOE – Rapid Port Opening Element
SCE – Seaport Command Element
SDDC - Surface Deployment and Distribution Command
SPOD - Seaport of Debarkation
STARTEX – Start of Exercise
TCJ3 - Director of Operations and Plans
TCJ3-T - Chief, Joint Training and Exercises Division
TCJ3-TC - TCJ3-T Deployment, Distribution, Command and Control Branch
TCJ6 - Director, Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems
TTP – Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures
USTRANSCOM - United States Transportation Command
VOCO – Verbal Orders of Commanding Officer

Section C - Terms

CCDR – A general term applied to a combatant commander, sub-unified commander, or joint task force commander authorized to exercise combatant command (command authority) or operational control over a joint force. (JP 0-2)

Communications System – Joint Publication 6-0 Joint Communications System, 20 March 2006, discontinues use of the term “command, control, communications, and computers (C4) systems” and replaces it with “communications systems”.

Enabling Force – Early deploying forces that establish critical capabilities to facilitate deployment and initial employment (including sustainment) of a force. See also deployment; employment; force. (JP 4-08)

Force Protection — Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile actions against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical information. These actions conserve the force’s fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy. Force protection does not include actions to defeat the enemy or protect against accidents, weather, or disease. Also called FP.(JP 3-0)

Functional Manager (FM) – USTRANSCOM Service Component responsible for providing support for liaison, data collection, tracking and monitoring activities for JTF-PO surface and/or air elements. Provides assistance in the training, readiness, and oversight (TRO) of Service forces and all other actions ICW and as directed by USTRANSCOM J3 DDOC

Joint Deployment Distribution Operations Center (JDDOC) – The JDDOC is a joint capability solution designed to satisfy the requirement to integrate strategic and theater deployment and distribution operations within each CCDR’s Area of Responsibility. The JDDOC, acting under the control, direction, and auspices of the CCDR, directs, coordinates and synchronizes deployment, redeployment, and distribution operations and enhances the combatant commander's ability to execute logistics plans with National Partners and assigned forces. The JDDOC supports the CCDR’s operational objectives by synchronizing and optimizing strategic and multi-modal resources to maximize distribution, force deployment, and sustainment. Its ultimate goal is to maximize CCDR combat effectiveness through improved end-to-end (E2E) distribution and Total Asset Visibility. [Note: This is an evolving definition]

Joint Task Force (JTF) – A joint force that is constituted and so designated by the Secretary of Defense, a combatant commander, a sub-unified commander, or an existing joint task force commander. (JP 0-2)

Operational Environment – A composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of military forces and bear on the decisions of the unit commander. Some examples are as follows. (a) permissive environment — operational environment in which host country military and law enforcement agencies have control as well as the intent and capability to assist operations that a unit intends to conduct, (b) uncertain environment — operational environment in which host government forces, whether opposed to or receptive to operations that a unit intends to conduct, do not have totally effective control of the territory and population in the intended operational area, and (c) hostile environment — operational environment in which hostile forces have control as well as the intent and capability to effectively oppose or react to the operations a unit intends to conduct. (JP 3-05.1)

Port of Debarkation (POD) – The geographic point at which cargo or personnel are discharged. This may be a seaport or aerial port; for unit requirements, it may or may not coincide with the destination. (JP 1-02)

Service force module – A hypothetical force module built per Service doctrine composed of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces and sustainment for an estimated period, e.g., 30 days (JP 1-02).

Single port manager – USTRANSCOM is the DOD designated single port manager for all common user aerial and seaports worldwide. The single port manager performs those functions necessary to support the strategic flow of the deploying forces' equipment and sustainment from the aerial and seaport of embarkation and hand-off to the combatant commander in the aerial and seaport of debarkation. The single port manager is responsible for providing strategic deployment status information to the combatant commander and to manage workload of the aerial port of debarkation and seaport of debarkation operator based on the commander's priorities and guidance. The single port manager is responsible through all phases of the theater aerial and seaport operations continuum, from a unimproved airfield and bare beach deployment to a commercial contract supported deployment. Also called SPM. (JP 1-02)

Sustainment – The provision of personnel, logistic, and other support required to maintain and prolong operations or combat until successful accomplishment or revision of the mission or of the national objective. (JP 1-02)

Throughput - In transportation, the average quantity of cargo and passengers that can pass through a port on a daily basis from arrival at the port to loading onto a ship or plane, or from the discharge from a ship or plane to the exit (clearance) from the port complex. Throughput is usually expressed in measurement tons, short tons, or passengers. Reception and storage limitation may affect final throughput. (JP 1-02)

Unit Type Code (UTC) – A Joint Chiefs of Staff developed and assigned code consisting of five characters that uniquely identify a "type unit." (JP 1-02)

Attachment 2 GLOSSARY OF VERIFICATION TERMS

JTF-PO JMETL. The Joint Task Force-Port Opening Joint Mission Essential Task list is derived from the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), CJCSM 3500.04D. Recommended Measures, Standards and Conditions for JTF-PO operations are also included. Measures and standards are for nominal scenarios and may not be practical under all conditions. The JTF-PO Joint Mission Essential Tasks (JMETs), Measures, Standards and Conditions describe JTF-PO capabilities and are constructed to serve as the basis for establishing joint training, readiness requirements, and verification criteria. They also form the basis for Components to build accompanying mission essential tasks from the Service perspective, and help establish the foundation for JTF-PO unit level training.

A mission is an assignment with a purpose and consists of operations. An operation is a military action that supports a mission and consists of tasks. A task is an action or activity derived from mission analysis, doctrine, standard procedures, or concepts that may be assigned an individual or organization to provide a capability.

A Joint Mission Essential Task is a mission task deemed essential to mission accomplishment and defined using the common language of the UJTL in terms of task, condition and standard.

A Measure provides the basis for describing varying levels of task performance.

A Standard is a quantitative or qualitative measure for specifying the levels of performance of a task.

A Condition describes the physical, military or civil environments that directly impact the performance/completion of a selected mission task.

The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) reference is provided in terms of strategic national (SN), strategic theater (ST), operational (OP) and tactical (TA) hierarchy.

Attachment 3
Sample Verification Letter

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR USTRANSCOM J3-T

FROM: USTRANSCOM J3-TC

SUBJECT: Letter of Verification, **XXXth** Rapid Port Opening Element

1. The **XXXth** Rapid Port Opening Element (RPOE) received a mission verification evaluation for JTF-PO capability while supporting **EXERCISE NAME** at **LOCATION**, from **DD-DD MON YR**. The primary focus of the exercise was airdrop of personnel/equipment and Air Land operations for the **SUPPORTED UNIT**. The **XXXth** Contingency Response Group was also evaluated and continues to maintain all Joint Mission Essential Task List (JMETS) standards for JTF-PO capability.
2. The **XXX** RPOE met all JTF-PO JMETS standards (simulated or actual). The **XXX** RPOE demonstrated desired performance and knowledge of procedures and directives in accordance with USTRANSCOM J3-T. I recommend the **XXX** RPOE be verified as an operational and fully capable of assuming JTF-PO taskings.
3. An After Action Report has been created to document discrepancies associated with this Verification Evaluation as well as any additional training required.

Name, Rank, Service
USTRANSCOM J3-TC
Verification Team Leader

Attachment:
After Action Report

1st Ind to USTRANSCOM J3-T, Date, Letter of verification, **XXXth** Rapid Port Opening Element

USTRANSCOM J3-T

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR USTRANSCOM J3

1. The **XXXth** Rapid Port Opening Element has completed all necessary requirements for verification IAW the JTF-PO Verification Program Operating Instruction, published JMETS, and IAW JTF-PO CONOPS, Annex B.3.2.

2. I concur with the recommendation for verification.

NAME
USTRANSCOM J3-T

Attachment:
After Action Report

2d Ind to USTRANSCOM J3, Date, Letter of Verification, **XXXth** Rapid Port Opening Element

USTRANSCOM J3

Date

MEMORANDUM FOR TCCC

1. The **XXXth** Rapid Port Opening Element has completed all necessary requirements for verification IAW the JTF-PO Verification Program Operating Instruction, published JMETS and IAW JTF-PO CONOPS, Annex B.3.2. is hereby verified to perform those duties as of **Date**.

Name
Rank, Service
Director of Operations and Plans

Attachment:
After Action Report

cc:
18 AF/CC
597 Trans BGE/CC
688 RPOE/CC
689 RPOE/CC
690 RPOE/CC
621 CRW/CC
615 CRW/CC
108 ARW/CC
123 AW/CC